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1. ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY: AN INTRODUCTION
BARRIERS to international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) remain large despitethe advances made in communication and transportation technology, massively lower
transportation cost and reductions in formal trade barriers. In particular, informal trade barri-
ers, cultural and institutional differences and modi operandi continue to act as intangible bar-
riers that create frictions similar to the well-researched traditional resistance factors (Head
and Ries, 2006; Disdier and Head, 2008). Economic diplomacy, the topic of our investiga-
tion, is increasingly being recognised as an instrument that can be used to deal with these
intangible barriers to trade (e.g. van Bergeijk, 2009; Yakop and van Bergeijk, 2011).
Economic diplomacy aims to influence decisions on cross-border economic activities pur-
sued by governments and non-state actors (Bayne and Woolcock, 2003; Okano Heijmans,
2011). Economic diplomacy involves the activities of the government and its (inter)na-
tional networks and can be defined as the use of government relations and government
influence to enable international trade and investment. Typically, nations interact with
other nations through a broad range of actions of (semi)permanent international representa-
tions (embassies, consulates and other public sector business support facilities) and diplo-
matic bilateral activities (trade and state visits). Governments also interact with foreign
and domestic companies to stimulate trade and investment through domestic institutions
(investment and export promotion offices) that stand under the auspices of economic diplo-
mats (Saner and Yiu, 2003). These domestic institutions support companies in their trade
and investment decisions and use information from the diplomatic network, and in many
countries, these institutions form the home basis for the trade and investment activities
employed within the embassy network.1 Economic diplomacy typically is an interdisci-
plinary subject to the fields of international economics, international political economy and
international relations and is receiving increasing attention in all three disciplines (van
Bergeijk et al., 2011b).
Economists traditionally have been sceptical about economic diplomacy. Key requirements
for government intervention are that the intervention targets markets failure and that the bene-
fits outweigh the costs of intervention. This was contested for economic diplomacy, especially
where it concerned export subsidies and export promotion agencies. Seringhaus and Botschen
(1991), for example, showed that the utility of export promotion is very limited and that
1 Economic diplomacy has several elements: bilateral economic activities between nations, including the
organisation of state and trade visits, use of investment and export promotion agencies and the export
promotion activities of the diplomatic network. Note that some of these elements have been labelled
‘bilateral economic diplomacy’ or ‘commercial policy’ (Saner and Yiu, 2003; Lee and Hudson, 2004;
van Bergeijk, 2009).
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export promotion efforts all too often do not address the needs of exporters. Likewise,
Gencturk and Kotabe (2001) found that export subsidies make businesses more profitable,
but have no effect on their turn-over. In the same spirit, export promotion agencies (EPAs)
have received considerable criticism in the 1990s. World Bank publications by Hogan
(1991) and Keesing and Singer (1991) criticised the establishment of EPAs especially in
countries with high trade barriers where export promotion would serve as a palliative; the
effective first best solution is to lower trade barriers. As a result of these influential World
Bank studies, many development institutions withdrew their support to EPAs (Lederman
et al., 2006).
The economic justification for economic diplomacy is based on (i) the existence of asym-
metric information for operating internationally companies and (ii) externalities associated
with the collection and sharing of information about market conditions and business opportu-
nities in international markets (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). If information is imperfect, mar-
kets do not produce Pareto efficient outcomes (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986). In the
internationalisation decision of firms, imperfect and asymmetric information is often a fac-
tor, because it is costly for firms to identify potential business partners and to assess their
capabilities (Rauch, 1996; Rangan and Lawrence, 1999). It is likely that this type of infor-
mation about export markets is under-produced from a societal point of view because first
movers cannot reap the full benefits of this information due to free riding rivals (Hausmann
and Rodrik, 2003). Local and competing firms will try to restrict the availability of infor-
mation in order to prevent competitors from entering the market. This is especially prob-
lematic when one wants to enter a developing country because published statistics and
other sources are scarcer for those markets. Governments may step in by providing ‘unique,
reliable and impartial access to information such as through the global embassy network
and other government channels and contact, which become available through the govern-
ment’s very long term and non-commercial attachment to overseas markets’ (Harris and Li,
2005, p. 74). By supplying information to companies, economic diplomats reduce transac-
tion cost, facilitate international flows (trade and investment) and contribute to a more effi-
cient allocation of capital.
Policymakers consider economic diplomacy relevant for four reasons. First, the share of
the former centrally planned economies in world trade has increased (Kowalski et al.,
2013). In these countries, government is still regarded as a natural partner in the economy.
Second, state enterprises may be the counterpart of a company operating in the interna-
tional markets. This necessitates entrepreneurs to seek cooperation with their national gov-
ernment in order to equalise the power balance and to level the playing field. Third,
(political) uncertainty about international transactions must often be removed or reduced.
Government involvement may signal that a transaction will not raise political resistance.
Finally, some high-quality information needed for international transactions sometimes
requires involvement of government officials. In the slipstream of increased policy rele-
vance, empirical studies on economic diplomacy appeared in leading journals, including
Rose (2007), Nitsch (2007), Lederman et al. (2010) and Volpe Martincus et al. (2010a).
The academic attention and the popularity of economic diplomacy among policymakers
increase the importance of knowledge about the (size) effect and significance of economic
diplomacy.
Since the empirical work in the field of economic diplomacy is still evolving, lacking con-
sensus is an issue. We take stock of this literature by providing a meta-analysis of 32 empiri-
cal studies published in the period 1986–2011. These studies basically provide us with two
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samples. Sample 1 contains 627 t-values and sample 2 consists of 963 reported significance
levels (both regarding the impact of economic diplomacy on international economic flows;
see Figure 1). Importantly, in the larger sample the number of insignificant and negative
coefficients exceeds the number of significantly positive coefficients (for sample 1, the
share of negative and insignificant t-values is 34 per cent). We scrutinise the mixed evi-
dence that is provided by these studies, controlling for differences in methodology, time
frame and data characteristics of the 32 studies by doing a meta-regression analysis. This is
a research method that enables researchers to synthesise and summarise previously obtained
empirical findings for a similar research question in a quantitative and statistically rigorous
fashion. Meta-analysis basically is a statistical approach in which the reported results are
controlled for the characteristics of the identified primary studies. It therefore both includes
and goes beyond a traditional systematic review. The use of a meta-analysis adds value to
a traditional review of the literature: a meta-analysis is less prone to subjective bias and
more transparent than a traditional literature review because it systematically analyses
sources of (quantitative) variation of earlier primary studies (Lazzaroni and van Bergeijk,
2015).
A meta-analysis enables us to combine the results from the different (sub)disciplines where
economic diplomacy is gaining ground. This is particularly relevant if only because the topic
of economic diplomacy should be studied from a multidisciplinary point of view while empir-
ical studies so far have by and large been mono-disciplinary in focus.
The contribution of this paper is, first, that this is the first meta-analysis of the effects of
instruments of economic diplomacy on international economic flows. Like other meta-ana-
lyses from the field of economics, we find that research design is an important determinant
for significance of the particular instrument(s) under econometric investigation (compare,
Ljungwall and Tingvall, 2008; Meyer and Sinani, 2009; Havranek and Irsova, 2010; Mebra-
tie and Van Bergeijk, 2011; Lazzaroni and van Bergeijk, 2015). Second, we identify impor-
tant methodological issues that can be taken into account in future research not only in the
field of economic diplomacy, but also in any emerging field. Third, we develop a logit
model of significance levels that allows us to consider 50 per cent more observations. This
innovation is relevant to research fields where establishing the meta-sign and its meta-sig-
nificance already is a relevant finding and where reporting in the primary studies frequently
416
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FIGURE 1
Sample 1 (Based on Reported and Calculated t-Values) Versus
Sample 2 (Based on Reported Significance Levels)
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is incomplete or inexact.2 The fourth contribution is that we show the importance of
conducting sensitivity analysis in meta-analysis for cross-disciplinary subjects like
economic diplomacy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews empirical research
that addresses the relation between economic diplomacy and trade and investment flows. We
discuss the problems encountered in these studies. Section 3 discusses the construction of our
sample and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 sets out the design of the meta-analysis,
and Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results and conducts a meta-regression sen-
sitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Most studies in our sample use the gravity model that has a long-standing history in ana-
lysing the international pattern of bilateral trade and investment flows (van Bergeijk and Brak-
man, 2010). The primary studies in our sample use economic diplomacy as one of the
determinants of international trade and investment. The parameter estimate of economic diplo-
macy can be interpreted as the partial derivative of international trade (investment) with
respect to the particular diplomatic instrument(s) investigated in the primary study.
Until the mid-1990s, the methodology still was rather crude from today’s perspective due
to limited computing power and data availability. The studies predominantly pertained to
cross-sectional analysis of bilateral political indicators based on events data to explain the
development of bilateral trade (Pollins, 1989a, 1989b; van Bergeijk, 1992, 1994; Polachek,
1997) and FDI (Nigh, 1985). The empirical works uncovered a positive correlation between,
on the one hand, trade (FDI) and, on the other hand, (net) diplomatic cooperation. Differences
in the significance, strength and sometimes the sign of the correlations occurred for single-
year studies (van Bergeijk, 1992, 1994) versus pooled cross sections (Nigh, 1985; Pollins,
1989a, 1989b) and for developing versus developed countries (Nigh, 1985). Also the extent to
which countries were integrated in the world economy (Pollins, 1989a) and the socio-political
system (centrally planned versus market economies; van Bergeijk, 1992, 1994) appeared to be
relevant.
The collapse of the USSR for some time reduced research interest in the topic, but in the
mid-2000s economic diplomacy returned on the research agenda. Improving on the earlier lit-
erature, researchers deployed panel data, advanced econometric methods and more specific
tools of economic diplomacy as explanatory variables. The focal point became the interna-
tional network of countries (consisting of embassies, consulates, the national, local and regio-
nal export and investment promotion offices) and the use of that network (trade missions at
various levels of diplomatic representation organised within this network).
Researchers at the World Bank published studies on the effectiveness of investment promo-
tion agencies (IPAs) (Morriset, 2003; Harding and Javorcik, 2007) and EPAs (Lederman
et al., 2006, 2010). According to these studies, IPAs and EPAs have a strong and statistically
significant effect. The studies claimed that on average a 10 per cent increase in the budget of
investment promotion leads to a 7.5 per cent increase in FDI flows (Morriset, 2003), that each
additional dollar of export promotion increases exports by 40 dollars for the median agency
2 One-third of the regression coefficients in our sample are reported without t-values or standard errors,
but only with insignificance and significance at the 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.
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(Lederman et al., 2006) and that a 10 per cent increase in the budget of export promotion
agencies increases exports by 0.6 to 1.0 per cent (Lederman et al., 2010). Later studies on
the topic of export promotion and investment promotion produced positively significant
effects of much smaller size (Bobonis and Shatz, 2007; van Veenstra et al., 2011). The
empirical work that followed the World Bank publications had a somewhat different and
wider scope and dealt with the regional effect of export promotion and embassies (Gil
et al., 2008; Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a; Gil-Pareja et al., 2011), the effect of the level
of development (van Veenstra et al., 2011) and the effect of export promotion on the
extensive and intensive margin of trade (Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia, 2008; Volpe
Martincus et al., 2010a, 2010b; Gil-Pareja et al., 2011; Volpe Martincus and Carballo,
2011).3
Others investigated economic diplomacy by focusing on the contribution of the diplomatic
service. Rose (2007) was the first to publish on the macroeconomic level effects of the net-
work of embassies and consulates-general (Rose, 2007). The effects of the changes in the
international diplomatic network are studied by Afman and Maurel (2010), and the hetero-
geneity in effects due to different forms of representation in this network are analysed by van
Bergeijk et al. (2011a, 2011b). The effects of export promotion units within the embassies are
investigated by Gil et al. (2008), Kang (2011), Hajakawa et al. (2010), Creusen and Lejour
(2011). Furthermore, research has emerged on the use of the international network via organ-
ising trade missions including state visits (Head and Ries, 2006; Nitsch, 2007; Creusen and
Lejour, 2011, 2013).
The recent studies report positive and significant coefficients. Rose (2007) finds that the
opening of an additional embassy or consulate is associated with 6 to 10 per cent higher
exports. Kang (2011) reports that a 10 per cent increase in the budget of export promotion
units in embassies increases exports by 2 to 6 per cent. Similarly, according to Hajakawa
et al. (2010) this effect is 5 to 6 per cent. Afman and Maurel (2010) calculate that the open-
ing of an embassy has a similar impact as a 2 to 12 percentage points reduction in ad valorem
tariff. Controlling for the level of development, van Veenstra et al. (2011), however, find a
smaller effect of only 0.5 to 0.9 per cent additional exports when increasing the number of
embassies and consulates by 10 per cent. The use of the diplomatic network via trade mis-
sions also shows mixed results varying from an export stimulating effect of 6 to 10 per cent
for the USA, France and Germany (Nitsch, 2007) to insignificant outcomes for Canada (Head
and Ries, 2006). Exploring micro data for the Netherlands, Creusen and Lejour (2011) find a
significant export promoting effect of trade missions of 5 to 20 per cent for low-income coun-
tries and OECD countries, respectively. Their estimates for missions to high-income countries
are insignificant (so that economic diplomacy hardly would seem to be effective in intra-
OECD trade).
Additionally, the interaction between measures of economic diplomacy is explored and
shows that the type of diplomatic representation seems to matter. Embassies have a larger
impact on trade than consulates, while honorary consulates on average do not add value (van
Bergeijk et al., 2011a, 2011b). Again the effectiveness of both embassies and consulates and
EPAs depends on the levels of development of the trade partners. The impact of economic
diplomacy seems to be significant in North–South, South–South and South–North trade and
3 The number of papers that deal with intensive and extensive margin, while growing, is not yet suffi-
cient to enable a meaningful meta-analysis. See, however, Moons (2012) for a review of the literature.
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weak (if at all) for the flows between developed countries (Creusen and Lejour, 2011, 2013;
van Veenstra et al., 2011).
The role of economic diplomacy and its relation to FDI flows has received less attention
(also in the more recent literature). Next to the earlier mentioned publications of Morriset
(2003), Harding and Javorcik (2007), Bobonis and Shatz (2007) on the role of investment pro-
motion, some work has been done on the impact of the bilateral politic/diplomatic relation on
FDI flows. The studies show a positive and significant impact of cooperation between coun-
tries, similar to the relation found for trade (Keshk et al., 2004; Polachek et al., 2007). Poli-
cies that increase economic security, such as similarity in foreign policy, enhance US FDI
(Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007).
It is difficult to draw general conclusions based on the reviewed literature because the
findings are rather heterogeneous. This heterogeneity may partially be explained by differ-
ences in the characteristics of the primary studies. A general observation is that analyses
are often constrained because of limited data availability and that frequently data sets had
to be built from scratch by the researchers by collecting primary data through surveys, by
inspecting a great many national websites (in many languages) and/or coding of qualitative
historical information. As a consequence, the metrics of economic diplomacy vary. Also,
some studies only relate to the trade (investment) activities of one source country. Exam-
ples are Head and Ries (2006) on the effectiveness of Canadian trade missions, Creusen
and Lejour (2011, 2013) on Dutch foreign network and its activities, Kang (2011) on the
effect of export promotion units for South Korea and Gil et al. (2008), Gil-Pareja et al.
(2011) on exports by Spanish regions. The samples of these studies are county specific, and
general conclusions cannot be drawn on such a narrow basis. The same is true for analyses
for only a limited group of source countries such as Hajakawa et al. (2010) that is limited
to only two countries and for many cross sections that only cover one year. Finally, most
studies relate to the more developed source countries. Since higher cultural and institutional
barriers typically exist at lower levels of development, the sample should ideally cover
source and destination countries at different stages of economic development (Yakop and
van Bergeijk, 2011). In order to deal with these issues, our meta-analysis combines the
information of the individual studies in order to distil the general pattern hidden in the
individual studies.
3. THE DATA
Our database contains the characteristics of studies that empirically investigate the impact
of economic diplomacy on international economic flows. As a starting point, we followed up
on the references made in the primary studies that were surveyed by van Bergeijk (2009),
checked studies that cited these studies and, importantly, extended the list of studies by
searching the EconLit electronic database and the internet, using Google Scholar.4 In our
search, we used broad keyword listings with the following terminologies: economic diplo-
macy, diplomacy and (international) trade, diplomacy and FDI, information barriers and diplo-
macy, embassies, trade missions, consulates, export promotion institutions, export promotion,
4 In constructing a sample for a meta-analysis, it is best practice to use multiple search engines, to check
repositories such as RepEc, SSRN and IMF, WTO and World Bank working papers and to follow up on
qualitative reviews of literature.
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investment promotion agencies and investment promotion institutions. This provided us with a
list of published articles, books, working papers and conference papers that investigate the
effect of economic diplomacy on trade and FDI.
Not all uncovered studies could be included in our sample. Qualitative papers, mostly
from the field of international relations, were not included since we were searching for
empirical research. Our initial search delivered effectiveness studies published in the
1990s (Seringhaus and Botschen, 1991; Seringhaus and Rosson, 1998), but these studies
do not deal with the impact of economic diplomacy on trade and FDI. Also excluded were
studies based on surveys about successful export strategies at the company level (Gencturk
and Kotabe, 2001; Bernard and Jensen, 2004; Francis and Collins-Dodd, 2004; Shamsu-
doha and Ynus Ali, 2006). The search, moreover, provided micro data studies dealing with
the effect of economic diplomacy on the margins of trade (Volpe Martincus et al., 2010a,
2010b; van Biesebroeck et al., 2011; Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2011). These studies,
mostly conducted by Inter-American Development Bank researchers, primarily focus on
the effects of trade promotion for Latin American countries (Volpe Martincus, 2010; van
Biesebroeck et al., 2011 analyse Canada). These papers look into the development of trade
patterns of firms that are treated with economic diplomacy, but cannot be included in our
sample: they provide information on how overall trade is being influenced by trade promo-
tion detailing the extensive and intensive margin leaving the question of its impact on the
level of total trade unanswered. The studies, moreover, report results which are specific to
the groups of assisted companies and do not answer the question what the overall (macroe-
conomic) impact of economic diplomacy is. Our initial search also provided us with a
number of studies that used a logit/probit model to estimate the relationship between eco-
nomic diplomacy and trade/FDI. In these models, the dependent variable is a binary vari-
able; that is, the analysis is concerned with estimating the change in the probability to
trade or invest abroad (see, e.g. Alvarez, 2004). As such, the results from these models do
not provide information on the size of the change in the level of trade or FDI by the use
of economic diplomacy.
We did not use all findings from the studies included in our initial sample. We only
included observations that relate to our search for the impact of economic diplomacy on inter-
national economic flows. So we use the observations that relate to the effect on all industries
and all products and exclude results relating to subsamples of goods and industries. From the
following studies, we used the overall or macro findings but not the product, industry or sec-
tor-specific results: Reuveny and Kang (1998), Harding and Javorcik (2007), Lederman et al.
(2010), Volpe Martincus et al. (2010a), Gil-Pareja et al. (2011) and Hajakawa et al. (2010).
Our final meta-analysis database consists of 32 studies investigating the relationship
between economic diplomacy and the macro impact on international flows (Table 1). All
primary studies investigate the impact of one or more instruments of economic diplomacy,
controlling for a wide range of potentially relevant variables including distance between
trading partners, markets size, common borders, common language and preferential trade
agreements. In the database, 963 coefficients on the effect of diplomacy and 627 t-values
are reported. Furthermore, we registered the dependent variable of the primary study, that
is, export, import, total trade or FDI, and the different instruments of diplomacy studied in
the primary studies. In order to be able to control for methodological differences, we also
included other study characteristics such as the number of observations used for the primary
regressions, the year of publication, the period under investigation and the econometric
method.
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The metrics for economic diplomacy differ widely; that is, economic diplomacy has been
reported based on diplomatic event data,5 the geography of the foreign network of countries
(embassies, consulates and foreign branches of export and investment promotion offices), the
activities deployed by the foreign network of countries (trade missions and state visits) and
finally activities headquartered in the source economy (export promotion) and destination
economy (investment promotion). Also substantial heterogeneity exists with respect to
research methods and dependent variables. We created three categories of moderator variables
for further analysis: empirical design factors, dependent variable characteristics and instru-
ments of economic diplomacy. Table 2 provides an overview of the various primary study
characteristics included in our sample.
While collecting data, we were confronted with substantial heterogeneity in functional
forms yielding a mix of linear and non-linear coefficients that, for consistent analysis, should
be transformed into elasticities to estimate the size effect of economic diplomacy. In order to
calculate the elasticity on average from linear models, we need to know average values of the
dependent and explanatory variables, but a number of studies do not report this basic informa-
tion. We repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, contacted authors of the primary studies to get the
missing data.6 Moreover, those studies in our sample that fully report basic and essential
information do so for the full sample, while regression results are often based on subsamples
(e.g. for OECD and non-OECD countries). We do not want to limit the research to regression
results that are based on full samples in order to avoid the loss of information regarding the
effect of different sample characteristics. As pointed out by Disdier and Head (2008, p. 43):
‘different estimates often differ in terms of sample period, method, etc., and therefore within-
study variation (. . .) can be used to assess the importance of such variables’. Since we are
interested in the impact of research design and subsamples, our missing information problem
needs to be solved.
Confronted with these issues, we initially decided to work with the reported or calcu-
lated t-values, because a t-statistic (the estimated coefficient divided by its standard devia-
tion) has no dimension and is often reported or can be calculated from the usually reported
statistics. Our method thus solves the difficulties posed by differing units of measurement,
specifications and incomplete reporting that makes a traditional meta-analysis of the size
effect impossible. By implication, we cannot answer the question of how much economic
diplomacy contributes, but we are able to answer whether it contributes significantly and
we can also investigate the sensitivity of this conclusion with respect to the methodological
characteristics of the primary studies. This more modest goal is appropriate in view of the
state of affairs in this field.
In a later stage, it became clear that while 963 coefficients are reported in the 32 primary
studies, only 627 t-statistics could be calculated. Again, we tried to contact the authors of the
primary studies with little recourse. To solve this second missing information problem, we
enriched our data set by manually counting ‘other ways’ in which some authors communi-
cated about significance levels. Many authors, for example, use symbols like *, ** and *** to
report the level of significance of their empirical estimate at the 10, 5 or 1 per cent level,
5 Papers investigating the influence of diplomatic relations based on political event data can look into the
effect of either more of less interaction between country pairs. These are two sides of the same coin. The anal-
ysis of less interaction is of similar size but opposite sign of an analysis on more interaction. For comparabil-
ity, we changed the sign of the regression coefficients that investigate less interaction.
6 We thank Lejour and Creusen for providing the necessary information about their 2011 publication.
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TABLE 2
Moderator Variables Meta-regression Analysis
Categories of
Moderator Variables
Moderator Var Name Description
Empirical design
factors
FIXED EFFECTS Dummy, 1 if fixed effects
estimate; 0 otherwise
NOTOLS Dummy, 1 if other than OLS
estimate; 0 if OLS
COUNTRYSPECIFIC Dummy, 1 if primary sample is
country specific; 0 otherwise
ENDOGENEITY Dummy, 1 if primary analysis
corrects for endogeneity; 0 otherwise
GRAVITY Dummy, 1 if primary regression
is gravity model; 0 otherwise
PANEL Dummy, 1 if panel data; 0 if
cross-sectional data
PRE2000 Dummy, 1 if primary study is
published before 2000; 0 otherwise
OBSERVATIONS Number of observations in the data
set of primary study
Dependent variable EXPORT Dummy, 1 if exports is dependent
variable primary study; 0 otherwise
IMPORT Dummy, 1 if imports is dependent
variable primary study; 0 otherwise
FDI Dummy, 1 if foreign direct investment
is dependent variable primary
study; 0 otherwise
TOTALTRADE Dummy, 1 if total trade is dependent
variable primary study; 0 otherwise
Instrument of
diplomacy
EMBASSIES Dummy, 1 if embassies is included
in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
CONSULATES Dummy, 1 if consulates is included
in primary study regressor; 0 otherwise
EMBASSIESANDCONSULATES Dummy, 1 if embassies and consulates
is included as 1 group in primary
study regressor; 0 otherwise
FOREIGN EPA Dummy, 1 if foreign export promotion
office is included in primary study
regressor; 0 otherwise
EPA Dummy, 1 if export promotion agency
is included in primary study regressor;
0 otherwise
IPA Dummy, 1 if investment promotion
agency is included in primary study
regressor; 0 otherwise
DIPLOMATIC RELATION Dummy, 1 if diplomatic relation is
included in primary study regressor;
0 otherwise
STATEVISITS Dummy, 1 if visits by head of state
is included in primary study regressor;
0 otherwise
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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respectively (the levels of significance are also dimensionless). By incorporating these results
(where we know the minimal significance level and the sign but not the actual t-statistic), we
can include an additional 335 regressions in our sample, categorised by their significance level
and using binary dummy variables (not significant or significant at the 5 or 1 per cent level,
respectively). After this extra effort, only one study that fitted our meta-search criteria
dropped out completely. Because of missing t-values, or information that would allow us to
calculate t-values (and also information that would allow us to calculated elasticities) for the
effect of economic diplomacy for trade of all industries, we had to drop Reuveny and Kang
(1998)7 (otherwise the sample could have covered 33 studies).
The reported t-statistics (Table 1) vary considerably between studies. A number of stud-
ies have insignificant mean and/or median t-values (Polachek, 1997; Head and Ries, 2006;
Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007; Bobonis and Shatz, 2007; Nitsch, 2007; Segura-Cayuela and
Vilarrubia, 2008; van Bergeijk et al., 2011a, 2011b; Ferguson and Forslid, 2011; van Veen-
stra et al., 2011). Others such as Gil et al. (2008), Hajakawa et al. (2010) and Volpe Mart-
incus and Carballo (2011), however, report very large t-statistics (both positive and
negative). These differences could be due to country-specific factors, data characteristics,
different time periods, differences in the dependent variable and alternative measures of
research design. We explore these sources of heterogeneity in more detail in the next sec-
tion by means of a multifactor regression in our meta-analysis, but before we do so we pro-
vide a first picture of the potential impact of some of the study characteristics. Following
other meta-analyses (Sinani and Meyer, 2009; Havranek and Irsova, 2010; Mebratie and
van Bergeijk, 2013), we first compute composite bivariate t-statistics for a number of vari-
ables that we will later use as moderator variables in our meta-regression. The advantage
of working with larger (sub)samples of t-statistics compared to looking at individual results
is that factors with low significance in small samples could be significant in the aggregate
even if they are not significant in the primary study, because for a combined sample the
large sample’s standard deviation is a more precise estimator of the population’s standard
deviation (Newbold, 1995). The uncertainty caused by the sample estimator as compared to
the population’s standard deviation is reduced as the sample size increases, and the t-distri-
bution more and more fits the standard normal distribution. Tests on the mean of aggregate
t-statistics are thus more powerful than looking into individual t-statistics. We therefore
computed the combined t-statistics by dividing the sum of t-statistics over the square root
TABLE 2 Continued
Categories of
Moderator Variables
Moderator Var Name Description
TRADE MISSION Dummy, 1 if visits by minister of other
representative is included in primary
study regressor; 0 otherwise
TRADE MISSIONS TOTAL Dummy, 1 if state visits dummy is
1 or trade mission dummy is 1; 0 otherwise
7 Reuveny and Kang (1998, Table 6, p. 59) only report the number of significant coefficients, but it is
unclear which of these coefficients relate to total trade. Contact with the authors did not solve this
problem.
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of the number of observations in the full sample. Let ti denote the t-statistic corresponding
to the specific characteristic of interest. N denotes the number of observations. Then, the
combined t-statistic tc becomes:
tC ¼
P
tiﬃﬃﬃﬃ
N
p  Nð0; 1Þ: (1)
This straightforward calculation of the combined t-statistic may, however, be influenced
by some studies that contribute particularly large numbers of t-statistics, for example
because a lot of sensitivity analyses are reported. Examples of such studies in our sample
are Gil-Pareja et al. (2007), Nitsch (2007) and Rose (2007). To deal with the overrepresen-
tation of parameters from such studies, we introduce weights per observation. Following
Djankov and Murrell (2002) and Wooster and Diebel (2010), normally distributed test
statistics are obtained as follows:
Pm
k¼1 wktkﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPm
k¼1 w
2
k
p  Nð0; 1Þ: (2)
Here wk represents the weight assigned to the k-th observation. The weight depends on the
total number of observations taken from a particular study; smaller weights are assigned to
studies that have larger numbers of reported t-values. For example, the study of Gil-Pareja
et al. (2007) contributes 64 observations. The weight assigned to each t-statistic is 1/
64 = 0.015625. If a study contributes only one t-statistic, as in our sample Polachek (1997),
the weight deployed to this observation is 1.
Results for aggregated and weighted aggregated t-statistics are presented in Table 3. We
did calculations on the full sample of studies and on a subsample excluding outliers to
check robustness. For the sample excluding outliers, we dropped the 5 per cent smallest
and largest observations, leaving a total number of 565 t-statistics. Table 3 shows that the
median t-statistics for all tested characteristics is always statistically significant except for
state visits. This is basically caused by the median t-value of Ferguson and Forslid (2011),8
but note that Head and Ries (2006) also have report insignificant and negative t-values (in-
cluding in their ‘preferred equation’). The state visits t-statistic based on the full sample
excluding outliers always shows significant aggregate t-values. The weighted t-statistic is,
however, negative.
Across studies, the use of export as a dependent variable is associated with more signifi-
cant effects of economic diplomacy than studies that use imports, total trade or FDI as the
dependent variable. The number of observations related to FDI flows is remarkably lower than
the number of observations for exports and imports.
As to the economic diplomacy characteristics, that is the instrument used to explain the
effect of economic diplomacy, studies that analyse embassies and consulates on average tend
to generate more significant outcomes than state visits, trade missions, EPAs and the more
general diplomatic relation measure. The weighted aggregate t-statistic suggests that, corrected
for the weight of individual studies, studies that only use embassies (as compared to embas-
sies and consulates combined into one dummy) as characteristic for economic diplomacy will
be more likely to report significant results.
8 Relatively heavy weights are assigned to the negative t-values from the Ferguson and Forslid study
with only four observations.
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Using a bivariate approach, Table 3 illustrates the extent of heterogeneity, both regarding
empirical design, the definition of the dependent variable and the economic diplomacy charac-
teristics. The next step is to investigate this in a multivariate setting. We do so by doing a
meta-analysis on our sample of t-statistics and significance levels.
4. DESIGN OF THE META-ANALYSIS
a. Methodology
A meta-analysis combines several studies that address a particular research question
with a similar design and investigates consistencies and discrepancies of the results of
the primary studies. Each primary study is treated equally in meta-analysis, even when it
does not use best practice methodology. Actually, alternative weighting schemes are
regarded as prone to bias (Stanley, 2001; Rose and Stanley, 2005). Accordingly, all pri-
mary studies provide data points in the knowledge-generating mechanism towards the
true relationship between economic diplomacy and international economic flows. The
analysis investigates the sensitivity of the reported estimates to variations in the assump-
tions of the primary studies. The essence of meta-analysis is to obtain a single estimate
of the effect of interest from statistics reported in each of several primary studies (Brad-
burn et al., 1998). This methodology is well established in medicine and psychology and
increasingly also in economics. The technique provides revised interpretations of earlier
research and is often useful to help indicate priorities for future research (Meyer and
Sinani, 2009).
We focus on the t-statistic of the coefficient that represents the impact of economic
diplomacy on international economic flows and the influence of study characteristics
(method, research design) on this statistic. Our approach helps to uncover the effects of
study characteristics on the sign and significance of the estimated effect of economic diplo-
macy on international flows. We start with a sample of 627 reported and (re)calculated t-
statistics. Following G€org and Strobl (2001), Ljungwall and Tingvall (2008), Meyer and
Sinani (2009) and Havranek and Irsova (2010), we estimate the following meta-regression
model:
Yij ¼ a0 þ b1OBSERVATIONSij þ b2NOTOLSij þ b3COUNTRYSPECIFICj
þ b4GRAVITYEQUATIONj þ b5PRE2000j þ b6ENDOGENEITYj
þ b7;...;10 ½primary dependent variableij þ b11;...;18 ½instruments of diplomacyij þ eij ð3Þ
In equation (3), we estimate how primary study characteristics influence the reported
t-statistics of economic diplomacy on international flows. In our case, Yij is the value
of the t-statistic of the economic diplomacy coefficient derived from the jth regression
in the ith article, a0 represents the (random) effect that controls for the commonality
and dependency of estimates within and across studies, and eij is the error term (Dis-
dier and Head, 2008; Meyer and Sinani, 2009). The explanatory variables in equa-
tion (3) include empirical design and quality factors, primary dependent variables from
the primary study and instruments of diplomacy used in the primary study (see Table 2
for classification and description).
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We present OLS, weighted OLS and random effects estimates of equation (3) for
comparison. In the weighted OLS model, we used probability weights to correct for the
structure of our sample.9 Because we have a few studies that contribute a large number of
observations to our sample, each observation is weighted by the inverse of its probability of
being part of our sample (Dupraz, 2013).
The random effects model is our preferred estimation. The random effects model uses
more realistic assumptions about the effect size, in this case the t-statistic, as compared to a
fixed effects model. Under fixed effects, the t-statistic of a given variable is assumed to be
homogenous across studies; that is, the fixed effect model assumes that there is one true effect
for all the studies in our sample (Hedges and Vevea, 1998). All observed differences would
in that case be attributed to sampling error. Given the diversity in the investigated instruments
of economic diplomacy, the differences in geographical coverage of the primary studies and
the substantial variety of time periods, it is vital to allow the t-statistic of economic diplomacy
to vary from study to study. Random effects model allows for different t-statistics per study
which we find more realistic given the diversity of the studies under review.
Next to the influence of study characteristics on the magnitude of the t-statistic, we also
investigate the probability of finding a significant coefficient. We can now use our more
extensive sample with 963 observations. We conduct a second meta-regression analysis with
the following regression model:
PðYij ¼ 1Þ ¼ a0 þ b1OBSERVATIONSij þ b2NOTOLSij þ b3COUNTRYSPECIFICj
þ b4GRAVITYEQUATIONj þ b5PRE2000j þ b6ENDOGENEITYj
þ b7;...;10 ½primary dependent variableij
þ b11;...;18 ½instruments of diplomacyij þ eij; ð4Þ
where yij is a binary variable that serves as the dependent variable. yij takes the value of 1,
if the coefficient of the ith regression in article j is significantly positive (we use different
specifications of the dependent variable that distinguish between the 5 or 1 per cent level,
respectively). And, yij = 0 if not. The relation between the dependent and the explanatory
variables will be estimated with a logistic regression. Logit analysis enables calculation of
the probability p that a specified use or availability of economic diplomacy yields a signifi-
cant t-stat. If this probability exceeds 0.5, a significantly positive t-value is ‘predicted’. We
distinguish the same three sets of explanatory variables as used in equation (3). Again, we
use weighted regressions and random effects to check for the robustness of our findings.
b. Empirical Design
We use the same set of explanatory variables in equations 3 and 4. The dependent vari-
able of course differs: in equation 3, it is a t-value as reported in the primary study, and in
equation 4, it is a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if the coefficient in the primary
study is significantly positive (either as reported in the primary study or by implication)
and else 0.
9 We also checked our regression using analytic weights. Here Yij varies at the individual level, but
moderator and control variables are at the study level. Using analytic weights does not change the sign
and pattern of significant explanatory variables.
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(i) Primary Dependent Variable
We classify the explanatory variable in the primary studies with mutually exclusive and
exhaustive dummy variables for EXPORT, IMPORT, FDI and TOTALTRADE in order to indi-
cate what explanatory variable was used in the primary study.
(ii) Instruments of Economic Diplomacy
The economic diplomacy characteristics in equation (3) include mutually exclusive and
exhaustive dummies for the instrument of economic diplomacy used in the study. The eco-
nomic diplomacy dummies are EMBASSIES, CONSULATES, EMBASSIESANDCONSULATES,
FOREIGNEPA, TRADEMINISTERS, PMORROYAL, EPA, IPA and DIPLOMACY. These vari-
ables, respectively, capture whether the economic diplomacy coefficient pertains to embassies,
consulates, embassies and consulates (combined explanatory variable), export promotion
offices abroad, trade mission, state visits, EPAs and IPAs or events data scores for the diplo-
matic relation.
(iii) Primary Study Characteristics
The empirical design factors are COUNTRYSPECIFIC, NOTOLS, PRE2000,
GRAVITYEQUATION, ENDOGENEITY and OBSERVATIONS. These variables capture
the fact that a study deals with one source country only, the estimation method, the
publication year, whether or not the equation in the primary study was a gravity model,
whether the primary study corrected for endogeneity and the number of observations,
respectively.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
a. Determinants of Magnitude t-Statistic Economic Diplomacy: Random Effects Model
Table 4 presents the results for the OLS (with and without probability weighing) and ran-
dom effects estimation of equation (3). For models 7 and 8, the sample without the 5 per cent
most extreme observations is used.
The baseline uses exports as the reference for the dependent variable and embassies and
consulates as the reference for the instrument of diplomacy under investigation in the primary
study. Both these reference variables are the mode for their specific group of factors included
in our econometric analysis.10 The references for the empirical design factors are based on
studies using standard OLS regression models based on multiple country databases published
after 2000. The constant term can be interpreted as the baseline meta-significance level; it is
positive and highly significant in all but one model.
Models 1, 3 and 5 are based on the full sample of studies and observations. Models 2, 4
and 6 are based on a smaller sample of 29 studies and 454 observations. The difference is
due to the fact that some of the primary studies do not report the number of observations used
for each reported regression. Three studies, Polachek (1997), Ciuriak and Kinjo (2006), Volpe
Martincus et al. (2010a), drop out entirely because the number of observations used for the
regressions in their papers is not provided. Likewise, observations of Rose’s (2007) extensive
sensitivity analyses can no longer be included when accounting for the number of
10 Export is used in 455 of 627 cases and embassies and consulates in 176 cases.
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observations.11 Studies that use a larger number of observations are a priori expected to find
higher t-statistics. This is also reflected in the direction and significance of OBSERVATIONS.
This finding (in accordance with the indicative funnel plot in Figure 2) implies that no strong
indications exist for publication and/or sample size bias in the primary studies.
Focusing attention on our preferred random effects models, we find that empirical design
factors play an important role in the reported results of the primary studies that investigate
the effect of economic diplomacy. Primary studies conducted on a single country basis
(COUNTRYSPECIFIC = 1) that correct for endogeneity (ENDOGENEITY = 1) are associated
with lower t-values.12 Gravity trade studies (GRAVITY = 1) report more significant results.
Alternatives to OLS (NOTOLS = 1) are not structurally associated with more significant coef-
ficients. The measure of the dependent variable is not associated with the magnitude of the t-
statistic indicating that studies on FDI, imports, exports and total trade can be meaningfully
combined in our meta-analysis.
The instrument of diplomacy that is investigated in the primary study influences the signifi-
cance of the coefficient in the primary study. If the primary study uses EMBASSIES as a
proxy for economic diplomacy, higher t-values are reported. The EMBASSIES dummy is positive,
but not always significant. The insignificant results are caused by sampling effects. Models 2, 4
and 6 leave out estimates if the number of observations used in the primary studies is not reported.
It is this loss of estimates that is driving the change from significant to insignificant for our
EMBASSIES dummy and not the inclusion of the OBSERVATIONS variable itself.13 It may there-
0
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)
FIGURE 2
Funnel Plot with Pseudo 95 per cent Confidence Limits
11 Rose (2007) provides the number of observations for his main regression results, but not for his sensi-
tivity analyses.
12 The OLS models provide some evidence that studies published before the 2000s report higher
t-values.
13 Details are available upon request.
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fore be concluded that primary studies using EMBASSIES report higher t-statistics. If in contrast
‘lower’ forms of foreign representation are subject of the study, the significance of the coefficient
in the primary study will be significantly lower. The results indicate that studies taking embassies
and consulates as one explanatory variable may lead to a problematic generalisation about the
effectiveness of the diplomatic network. Our regression analyses show that regressions using
embassies will give more significant coefficients than the embassies and consulates benchmark.
Consulates are systematically associated with lower levels of significance. Grouping the two (em-
bassies versus consulates) into one (embassies and consulates) thus leads to an average significance
that is too high for consulates and too low for embassies.
STATE VISITS and TRADE MISSIONS stand out negatively in all eight models. Primary
studies reporting coefficients for these instruments tend to find a significantly lower t-statistic
as compared to our established benchmark (compare Table 3). The remaining proxies for
economic diplomacy, that is export and investment promotion offices, export promotion units
within embassies (our FOREIGN EPA OFFICE dummy) and the diplomatic relation, are
weakly related to a lower magnitude of the t-statistic. The sign is always negative, but many
of our specifications are not significant.
b. Logit Estimates of Factors Explaining Economic Diplomacy Significance
In order to broaden our sample, we resort to an analysis that does not focus on the
actual t-value but on the minimal significance level as reported in the primary studies.
The cost of this procedure is the loss of information on the actual size of the t-values.
The gain is that we can increase our sample by 54 per cent. Our logit meta-regressions
show the relationship between, on the one hand, the empirical design, the dependent vari-
able under investigation and the characteristics of economic diplomacy and, on the other
hand, the likelihood of finding statistically significant coefficients for economic
diplomacy.
Table 5 presents the logit estimates of equation (4). We investigate two variants: in the
first variant, we require that the primary study reports significance at the 5 per cent level
and better (models 1, 2 and 3); in the second variant, the dependent variable is assigned
value 1 if the reported significance in the primary study is at the 1 per cent level and better
(models 4, 5 and 6). The reference case is similar to the one deployed earlier: a primary
study that measures the impact of foreign representation (embassies and consulates) on
exports using OLS and based on multiple source countries. The models perform well in
terms of correct predictions. Model 1 predicts reported 5 per cent significance correctly in
76 per cent of the cases. The share of correct in-sample predictions increases for models 4
and 5 (1 per cent significance) from 73 to 82 per cent. Table 5 reports sensitivity and speci-
ficity of the four logit models. Sensitivity, the true positive rate, measures the correctly
identified proportion of actual positives. True positives are the predicted significant coeffi-
cients for economic diplomacy. Specificity measures the proportion of true negatives, that
is insignificant coefficients of economic diplomacy, which are correctly identified. As
expected, the models that include OBSERVATIONS generally perform better on both
sensitivity and specificity.
The performance of models (1), (2), (4) and (5) in classifying economic diplomacy
coefficients as significant or insignificant can also be illustrated by plotting the fraction of true
positives out of the positives versus the fraction of false positives out of the negatives (the
ROC curve in Figure 3). The larger the area under the ROC curve, the better the global
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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performance of the diagnostic test. A perfect diagnostic test would yield an area under the
ROC curve of 1, representing 100 per cent sensitivity (no false negatives) and 100 per cent
specificity (no false positives). All models perform relatively well with areas between 81 and
86 per cent.
The logit analysis of significance levels in Table 5 agrees with the random effects
analysis of t-values in Table 4 regarding OBSERVATIONS (primary studies with more
observations are more likely to report significant coefficients of economic diplomacy),
COUNTRYSPECIFIC (it is less likely that studies with one source country report signifi-
cant coefficients), IMPORT (insignificant), TOTAL TRADE (the primary study is less
likely to report significant coefficients when it investigates total trade), CONSULATES
(studies that specifically study consulates as opposed to a summary measure for con-
sulates and embassies are less likely to report significant coefficients), TRADE MISSION
and STATE VISIT (all are associated with a lower probability of reporting significant
coefficients). These findings are robust with respect to sample, estimation technique and
significance variant.
In contrast to the results in Table 4, the logit analysis find that studies published before the
year 2000 (PRE2000 = 1) are significantly more likely to report positive results at both the 5
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area Under ROC Curve = 0.8141
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area Under ROC Curve = 0.8340
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area Under ROC Curve = 0.8151
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Se
ns
iti
vi
ty
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area Under ROC Curve = 0.8562
FIGURE 3
Model 1, 2, 4 and 5 ROC Curve
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and 1 per cent significance levels.14 We also see this for studies that correct for endogeneity prob-
lems (ENDOGENEITY = 1; models 2 and 6). Primary studies with FDI as dependent variable are
more likely to find significant results. For EPA and IPA, we find highly significant negative coeffi-
cients, a result that is also supported by the OLS and WOLS estimates in Table 4. Primary studies
that use EMBASSIES alone are less likely to report significant coefficients.
All in all, harvesting more binary information from primary studies is rewarding. The anal-
yses confirm our hypothesis of the diverging effects within the economic diplomacy network.
Also the negative influence of source country-specific data sets on the significance of eco-
nomic diplomacy coefficients is confirmed. These are important results that should be taken
into account in the design of future studies.
c. Sensitivity Analysis
Given the emerging and interdisciplinary nature of the economic diplomacy research field,
we test our findings for various possible sample and definition effects. Thus far, we have used
a broad definition of economic diplomacy based on Bayne and Woolcock (2003), Saner and
Yiu (2003) and Lee and Hudson (2004). We will use a different definition of diplomacy that
does not include the elements of the paper of Saner and Yiu (2003), that is domestic invest-
ment and export promotion institutions. What remains is a more homogeneous set of eco-
nomic diplomacy variables that mainly concentrate on the actions of diplomats within the
foreign network.
We also investigate the sensitivity of our meta-regression analysis for subsamples of papers
published in peer-reviewed (international) economics journals, and exclude working papers
and papers that do not correct for endogeneity, respectively.
We test the same baseline as presented earlier. Models (1)–(6) report random effects esti-
mates, and the absolute t-value is the dependent variable. Models (7)–(12) report logit esti-
mates and predict the likelihood of finding significant primary study results at the 5 per cent
level or better.
Generally the results of the sensitivity analyses are comparable with the earlier reported
meta-regression analyses. Study characteristics influence the empirical results of primary stud-
ies across all samples and estimation techniques. Studies that focus on a single source country
(COUNTRYSPECIFIC = 1) are associated with lower t-values. Studies that use OLS do not
significantly generate higher t-values than studies using more advanced econometric tech-
niques. Regarding the instruments of economic diplomacy, both the random effects and logit
estimates indicate lower significance levels for studies that use CONSULATES and STATE
VISITS. The earlier identified differences between the random effects and logit estimates con-
cerning our EMBASSY, DIPLOMACY and ENDOGENEITY dummy are consistent across all
sensitivity analyses. Compared to the random effect regressions, we again see that the logit
analysis is more likely to predict positive and significant deviations from the baseline model
for studies published before 2000 (PRE2000 =1) and a lower likelihood of finding significance
for EPAs.
Across the tested samples in Table 6, FDI is no longer associated with higher t-values, but
this mainly reflects the small number of studies of varying quality, something not uncommon
14 The former is in line with the results for OLS and WOLS in Table 4; the latter finding probably is a
spurious finding as GRAVITY has become negative (it was positive and significant), while corrections for
endogeneity by and large occur in the gravity models.
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in an emerging research field. Here, our conclusion is simply that the effect of economic
diplomacy on FDI should be subject to further investigation to reduce the variance between
study results.
As to the differences that are analytically relevant, we note the lower and less significant
t-values for the base line using the subsample of primary papers published in peer-reviewed
economics journals. In this multidisciplinary field, the implication is that the economic profes-
sion is less convinced of the significance of economic diplomacy. This is also reflected in the
results for the subsample without working papers (economics tends to focus on published
peer-reviewed articles) and papers that do not address causality (correction for causality is a
common requirement in economics). The earlier reported higher meta-significance is thus
partly driven by working paper publications and publications in other research fields than eco-
nomics (predominantly international relations). From this same analysis on subsamples, we
learn that the economics papers are more likely to produce positive and significant t-statistics
when a gravity model (GRAVITY = 1) is used.
This sensitivity analysis shows that it is rewarding to take into account several subsamples
in a meta-analysis, especially when the research topic is interdisciplinary.15 Although it is
common practise in meta-analysis to analyse all available papers that address the same
research question if metrics are comparable (or can be made comparable as a group), it in this
case proves to be rewarding to also investigate subsamples of primary studies because best
practices differ between the different scientific disciplines.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigated whether economic diplomacy has a significant effect on trade and
investment flows and what the sign of that relationship is. Due to the heterogeneity of specifi-
cations and the occurrence of substandard reporting in the primary studies, we resort to the
analysis of t-statistics. Analysing 627 t-statistics of 32 primary studies in the aggregate, we
conclude that the bivariate evidence supports a positive and significant effect of economic
diplomacy with the exception of state visits (Table 3). Our meta-regression analysis (Table 4)
points towards more heterogeneity in the significance of economic diplomacy coefficients and
highlights the importance of research design and other characteristics of the primary studies.
In particular, we find that primary studies that study only one source country are less likely to
report significant positive effects and that studies that use a variable that lumps embassies and
consulates(-general) into one indicator miss that these instruments differ significantly and
should thus be included as separate instruments in future research.
We also perform a logit analysis of reported discrete significance levels (not, 5 and 1 per
cent) increasing our sample to 963 observations (Table 5) that by and large supports the find-
ings on the smaller sample demonstrating robustness with respect to sample, methodology and
significance variant. The logit analysis differs in two respects: studies published before 2000
are more likely to report significant coefficients and significant results, and studies that use
FDI are more likely to report positive and significant impact of economic diplomacy (research
on the influence of economic diplomacy of FDI is scarce: only 54 of 963 regressions deal
with the effect of economic diplomacy on FDI flows, providing a clear indication that future
research should deal with this issue). This approach loses information on the magnitude of the
15 We thank the referees of this journal for insisting on doing the analysis for the different subsamples.
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t-value, but it enlarges our sample and thus also gains information. Our econometric analyses
show that reported effects of economic diplomacy on trade and investment in individual stud-
ies are sensitive to model specification and that this is true in the large and the small sample
and independent of the estimation technique. This analysis also reveals that there is a differ-
ence in the reported significance of economic diplomacy coefficients between research fields
and published versus working papers, even after correcting for study characteristics.
The fact that we see statistically significant and economically meaningful positive coeffi-
cients for economic diplomacy does not mean that the instrument is efficient. This would
demand more in depth knowledge of its benefits and costs. Also from this perspective, there
is a clear need for improving the availability of data, for increasing the country coverage of
the data and for better and more comprehensive reporting of findings and basic statistics.
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